

a recipient's social security payments must be reduced, or stopped completely, if he earns a certain amount of money during a year.

A retirement test of one form or another has been written into the Social Security Act since it was first enacted in 1935. In its present terms the law states that any recipient who earns more than \$1,200 a year will lose \$1 of benefits for every \$2 of earnings in excess of \$1,200 up to \$1,700 and \$1 of benefits for every \$1 of earnings over \$1,700 a year. Two major exceptions to this requirement are that it does not apply to individuals age 72 or over and that no reduction in benefits will be made for any month in which the recipient earns less than \$100 in wages or fails to render substantial services in connection with self-employment activities.

In my opinion, the enactment of the retirement test was one of the most unfortunate and regrettable actions taken by Congress in connection with the social security program. I am sure that there are multitudes among the millions of individuals receiving social security benefits, and a good many among those charged with administering the law, who share my view.

The retired worker views the retirement test as an incomprehensible technicality that interferes with his desire to work, and his efforts to be as independent as possible. Untold numbers on the social security rolls are prevented from accepting employment because of the retirement test and many more are forced to curtail their employment activities to keep their earnings within the \$1,200 limit.

The retired worker becomes more irritated and confused when he is told that the retirement test applies only to earned income, not to investment income. He asks himself, "Why penalize me because I need to work to maintain my home, while my more fortunate neighbor is allowed to receive a tidy income from his stock holdings without losing any of his social security benefits?"

This is a hard question to answer, and it is only one of the difficult questions the people in the social security district office must answer when they try to explain the retirement test to someone who feels that he has been treated unfairly because of it.

Several years ago the House Ways and Means Committee asked the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to study the retirement test. In response to this request the Department submitted a report to the committee in 1960. In this report the Department made the following candid statement which reflects the inexorable conflict of desires inherent in the retirement test:

The fact must be faced that the retirement test is the center of an insoluble dilemma. There is, on the one hand, the need to conserve the funds of the program by not paying benefits to people who have substantial work income, and on the other hand, the need to avoid interfering with incentives to work. Both of these objectives cannot be fully accomplished. The best that can be done is to accommodate the two, so that

while the funds of the system are in a large part directed to the most socially useful purposes, at the same time interference with incentives to work is kept at a reasonably low level.

Mr. President, I do not believe that the present law maintains a proper accommodation between the needs stated in the Department's report. I think that it does interfere unreasonably and unwisely with an individual's inclination and incentive to work. What is more, I think that the present retirement test hits hardest upon those individuals who have the greatest desire and the greatest need to work in order to supplement their retirement income.

Under the Social Security Act, the maximum benefit a retired worker can receive is \$127 a month. This adds up to \$2,974 a year. Even this maximum amount is hardly enough to sustain an individual for a year. Very few individuals, however, are drawing this maximum amount. The average old-age benefit now being paid to the retired worker under social security is little over \$76 a month. In July of 1962 it was \$76.09. This average payment, which totals to only \$917.08 a year, is most certainly not enough for a retired worker to live on. If the retired worker has a wife who qualifies for a wife's benefit, she receives one-half the amount that the retired worker is entitled to.

It is evident from these figures that most people retired on social security must have supplementary income in order to maintain themselves at decent living standards. If they do not have substantial annuity income of one sort or another or if they were not able to build up sizable amounts in savings or investments, they must seek out employment—or ask for public assistance—to pay their bills.

The people who are most adversely affected by the retirement test are those who are entitled to lower social security benefits. Not only are they, as a general rule, most in need of added income, but they see their earnings eating into and eliminating their social security benefits sooner. Those who receive lower benefits cannot earn as much as those receiving higher benefits before their benefits are cut off completely. A few examples will illustrate this point. Everyone whose earnings are subject to the test loses \$1 in benefits for every \$2 of earnings between \$1,200 and \$1,700 and \$1 in benefits for every dollar of earnings over \$1,700. The more he earns, the less he receives in benefits until his benefits are wiped out completely. The point at which his earnings wipe out his benefits is called the overall earnings limit, and it varies with the amount of the benefit. The overall earnings limit for a person receiving the minimum benefit of \$40 a month is \$1,930 a year. If a person receiving a minimum benefit earns this much a year he receives no social security payment. The overall earnings limit for a retired worker receiving close to the average benefit—say it is \$76 a month—is \$2,360. A person receiving the maximum primary benefit of \$127, however may earn \$2,974 a year

before he reaches his overall earnings limit and a retired worker whose family is receiving the maximum family benefit of \$254 a month does not reach his overall earnings limit until he earns \$4,498.

The bill I am introducing is designed to bring about a more balanced accommodation between the conflicting needs of the retirement test. It would simply raise the basic exempt amount from \$1,200 to \$2,400 a year and provide for dollar-for-dollar reduction in benefits for earnings over \$2,400. The amount of \$1,200 has remained unchanged in the law since it was put in in 1954. Living costs and wage rates have increased so much since that time that \$1,200 is no longer an adequate or realistic figure. I feel that it must be raised in order to lessen the discriminatory effect of the retirement test on those who are ready, willing and able—and in many cases forced—to work.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 466) to amend title II of the Social Security Act to increase to \$2,400 the annual amount individuals are permitted to earn without suffering deductions from the insurance benefits payable to them under such title, introduced by Mr. Moss, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Finance.

BAY OF PIGS RESOLUTION

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I submit a resolution, ask that it be referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the body of the Record.

I also ask unanimous consent that two newspaper articles pertinent thereto may be printed in the Record.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the resolution and articles will be printed in the Record.

The resolution (S. Res. 54) was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, as follows:

Whereas the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April of 1961 failed for the lack of adequate American assistance, including an air cover for the landing forces; and

Whereas the American public was led to understand for twenty-one months that an air cover had definitely been promised to the invading force and withheld at the last minute on orders from the President of the United States; and

Whereas the Attorney General of the United States has now stated that no such air support was ever contemplated in the invasion plan; and

Whereas the Attorney General of the United States has further stated that the invasion plan had the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency; and

Whereas an invasion plan which did not include air cover was foredoomed to failure in the minds of veteran military experts; and

Whereas the Attorney General's statements have consequently called into question the wisdom and efficiency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency; and

Whereas the Attorney General's account of what happened at the Bay of Pigs has left the American public in a state of confusion as to the true facts; and

Whereas the continued presence of Communist military forces and equipment in Cuba makes that island a persistent threat to the United States and the Western Hemisphere; and

Whereas a full disclosure of the invasion plans for the Bay of Pigs can no longer be considered a breach of military security: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Armed Services or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof is authorized under sections 134 (a) and 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1940, as amended, and in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate to conduct a full and complete study to determine the true facts surrounding the Bay of Pigs invasion with particular reference to the kind of American assistance promised to the invading force.

SEC. 2. The committee shall report its findings upon the study and investigation authorized by this resolution to the Senate at the earliest practicable date, but no later than March 31, 1963.

SEC. 3. Expenses of the committee under this resolution, which will not exceed \$100,000, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee.

The articles presented by Mr. GOLDWATER are as follows:

THE MISSING AIR COVER

For some time, Kennedy administration spokesmen have been denying privately that the President called off planned U.S. air cover for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Attorney General Kennedy, in two interviews, now has put this denial on the record.

The Attorney General gave his version of the affair in separate interviews to U.S. News & World Report and to the Knight newspapers. The interviews do not jibe in every detail, but they are in substantial agreement.

It is an incredible story. According to Mr. Kennedy, there was never anything in the invasion plan which called for U.S. air cover of the landing area. This was never suggested by the military and, in fact, was never even considered. Yet, he says, the wholly inadequate plan was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also by the CIA, which had primary planning responsibility. And, of course, it received final approval from the President.

On the Saturday before the invasion a flight of obsolete B-26 bombers, World War II vintage, took off from a Latin American base and made a strike against Castro's landing fields and planes. Another strike was supposed to have been made early the following Monday, timed to coincide with the landing of the refugee troops. But the first strike had caused a flurry at the United Nations; the President decided the second should be postponed unless those who had responsibility for the plan had strong objections, and the second strike did not come until later in the day.

At that time, according to the Attorney General, it did not accomplish much.

This is hardly surprising. For Castro's planes, their pilots alerted by the landing, were in the air, and three or four T-33 jets, inherited from the Batista regime and armed with rockets, were blasting the landing beach, sinking supply ships, and chasing the propeller-driven B-26's out of the sky.

It was on this wretched basis, according to the Attorney General, that the invasion effort foundered and failed, and Castro became an enduring menace in the Western Hemisphere. Still, things might have been

worse. What if such botched planning had formed the basis for a major U.S. military operation? We would be lucky if anyone had gotten out alive.

U.S. AND THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO—QUESTION OF MILITARY COMPETENCE OR CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE IS RAISED

(By David Lawrence)

The American people are entitled to know whether the chiefs of their armed services are incompetent or whether, in strictly military operations, they are being interfered with by civilians in the Government.

A congressional investigation of just what happened before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba took place in April 1961, is more than ever necessary now, because of what is being disclosed as the true story of the fiasco. For unless the responsibility of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff during military operations is clearly fixed, the capacity of the United States to prevent or resist armed attacks in this hemisphere may be open to question.

More than 300,000 men of our armed services were mobilized last October inside the United States for a possible invasion of Cuba in order to get rid of the Soviet missile bases there. But there is no way to judge whether the military chiefs even then had the full authority to act and just what restrictions were placed upon them which could have affected the success of that expedition.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who—because he is a brother of the President—is regarded as the administration's authoritative spokesman in many matters outside his own department, has just given two interviews on the Cuban fiasco—one to the Knight newspapers and the other to U.S. News & World Report.

The two interviews dovetail, though they do not cover all of the same points. The Attorney General told David Eraslow, Washington correspondent of the Knight newspapers, that there had been no invasion plan completed during Mr. Eisenhower's term. He said: "There was just a general concept. The logistics and the details were worked out after the President [Kennedy] took office."

Added interest has developed now in this whole subject, because many of the Cuban officers of the invasion force, who were recently ransomed have been telling Americans that the United States had assured them of air cover. Attorney General Kennedy makes quite a point of the fact that no U.S. air cover was ever promised. Technically, this is correct. But the United States was fully cognizant of the air support the Cubans were supposed to have. Yet this was inadequate. Attorney General Kennedy said in his interview in U.S. News & World Report:

"The first point is that there was not U.S. air cover and none was withdrawn. In fact, the President didn't withdraw any air cover for the landing forces—United States or otherwise."

"What happened was this: One air attack had been made on Saturday on Cuban airports. There was a flurry at the United Nations and elsewhere and, as a result, U.S. participation in the matter was coming to the surface. This surfacing was contrary to the preinvasion plan. There was supposed to be another attack on the airports on Monday morning."

"The President was called about whether another attack which had been planned should take place. As there was this stir about the matter, he gave instructions that it should not take place at that time unless those having the responsibility felt that it was so important it had to take place, in which case they should call him and discuss it further. And that's what was postponed. It wasn't air cover of the beaches or landings. And, in fact, the attack on the airports took place later that day."

The air cover provided was from a base in Central America. What part the U.S. Government played in organizing it is not disclosed. In the middle of a military operation, however, you can't make a long-distance call to the White House and discuss the next move. The anti-Castro forces were sure air cover was coming from somewhere.

The Attorney General was asked who did the planning. He declared that the plan that finally went into effect was approved by our military—the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency. He added that, while the Joint Chiefs approved the plan, the responsibility for the planning lay primarily with the CIA, and that, since the President had to give final approval to the plan, he had accepted the blame.

In both interviews the Attorney General said that U.S. airpower was to have been used only if the ships transporting the Cuban invasion force had been detected by Castro before they reached the target area and were attacked on the high seas on their way back to Central America. This is the explanation given for the presence of U.S. warships, including an aircraft carrier, in the vicinity of the Bay of Pigs on the day of the invasion. Yet it is asserted that before the invasion the President had made it clear that U.S. Armed Forces, including airpower, would not be used.

In the interview in the Knight newspapers, the Attorney General said, "The plan that was used was fully cleared by the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

But what does "cleared" mean? Do the Joint Chiefs take responsibility for any such plan as was employed?

Listing the major mistakes, Mr. Kennedy added: "There was not sufficient air cover at the beach. That was a mistake. There were not enough men and equipment. That was a mistake. Underestimating the T-33's (Castro's airplanes)—that was a serious mistake. The planning was inadequate, just inadequate."

But who did all this planning, and why wasn't someone in the U.S. Air Force able to say in advance whether the T-33's had the capacity to carry rockets? These were the U.S. planes originally given to the Batista regime in Cuba.

The important details have never been divulged, as there has been a constant cover-up. But if Congress now fails to make a searching inquiry, with testimony available to the public, another military fiasco could occur, especially if the same military planners are still in command at the Pentagon or elsewhere.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I have today submitted a resolution calling for a full and impartial investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee into the circumstances surrounding the so-called Bay of Pigs attempt to invade Cuba in April of 1961. It is my firm conviction that only through such an inquiry can the American people be fully informed about the events attendant to one of the most inglorious adventures in which this Nation ever has become involved. It is my belief that such an airing of facts attendant to the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt has been made mandatory by recent statements by the Attorney General of the United States purporting to tell what was promised to the invading force by the U.S. Government and what happened when the invasion failed.

Because the fate of Cuba is a matter of extreme importance to the American people and because the full story of the Bay of Pigs fiasco has never been told,

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the time is long past for an adequate, uncolored accounting of this disgraceful chapter in the history of the Kennedy administration.

Mr. President, I suggest that it is an insult to the intelligence of every concerned American for the Attorney General of the United States—the President's brother—to give an informal, disjointed account of this important matter in a couple of exclusive interviews which did not even cover the entire American press. And I suggest the form that these revelations took—in carefully arranged interviews—indicates that they were mapped with only one object in mind: to whitewash the Kennedy administration. Consider, Mr. President, that for 21 months the people of the United States have been led to believe that the United States had promised the Cuban invading force air cover and naval support.

And there was no denial from the White House, nor from the Attorney General, when stories were printed throughout the American press that the air cover was withheld on orders of the President. It is true, President Kennedy manfully accepted all the blame for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. But it is also true that he never gave the American people a true account of what had been planned and what actually occurred. Now, after all this time, we get from the Attorney General an account which defies belief and runs counter to everything the American people had been led to believe and contradicts the understanding of almost every man engaged in the abortive invasion attempt.

The Attorney General tells us that the invasion plan—without provision for an air cover—had the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency as well as that of the President.

Does he ask us to believe that seasoned military men—such as the members of the Joint Chiefs—ever seriously considered that an invasion force of 1,500 men could succeed in establishing a beachhead in Cuba and moving on to join with guerrilla forces to liberate the island from the grip of a fully armed Communist dictator? I suggest that this assumption defies belief. Any military man with 10 minutes of experience knows that not only an air cover but also naval support is not only advisable but also absolutely essential to any kind of a landing operation on an island as small as Cuba.

In effect, what the Attorney General has done in his interesting and highly questionable account of the Bay of Pigs is cast grave doubts on the ability of the American military establishments. If we take as fact his statement that no air cover was planned and then add to that the number of mistakes he listed as reasons for the invasion's failure, then we must assume that the military men who approved the plans were entirely lacking in experience as well as judgment.

The Attorney General says it was a mistake to invade with only 1,500 men. This fact should have been apparent before the invasion began. No military

commander I have ever met would ever think of launching an invasion against an entrenched Communist regime with only 1,500 men—no matter how well armed and supported they were.

And this brings me to one of the most important reasons why I believe a thoroughgoing investigation is needed right away. That reason is that the Congress of the United States and the American people must find out once and for all just how much influence inexperienced civilian officials are wielding in military matters which affect the security of the United States and the cause of freedom throughout the world. I say very frankly that the plan for the invasion of Cuba—as described by the Attorney General—looks exclusively like the work of some civilian strategists who have never faced up to the realities of a rigid military situation. It certainly looks like the last type of a military operation that ever would gain the approval of men who drew their experience from World War II or the Korean war.

In other words, Mr. President, if we accept the Attorney General's account, we must decide that the American end of the Bay of Pigs invasion was in the hands of the rankest kind of military amateurs. And I do not have to remind Senators that in these days of cold war crisis we cannot afford to have military amateurs making our plans.

Why is it, for example, that in 1961 the administration thought we could invade Cuba with 1,500 men without air cover or naval support, but in 1962, when it was thought we might have to invade Cuba to remove Russian missiles, a force of more than 300,000 men and every kind of air support possible was mustered along our southern coast? It is true that in the interim Castro had obtained heavy supplies and manpower from the Soviet bloc. But he did not receive enough to make this kind of a difference on our plans for invasion.

Mr. President, there are more reasons why an investigation of the Bay of Pigs invasion is needed than I can possibly get into here today. But I believe it is sufficient to say that the American people are entitled to the fullest disclosure of the facts that it is possible for this Congress to give them. I am convinced that the people are not going to be satisfied with piecemeal and informal accounts given by members of the administration to favored correspondents or selected publications. I believe that the Committee on Armed Services should be authorized to immediately begin work on such an investigation. I would suggest that they call in Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the invasion, and Allen Dulles, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as everyone in the Pentagon or the CIA or the State Department, or any other Government department who had anything to do with the mapping and carrying out of the Bay of Pigs plans.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, I should like to make a

recommendation to my colleagues in the Senate before more partisan speeches are made involving the foreign policy interests of this Republic.

If Members of the Senate will go to the Foreign Relations Committee room and ask for the privilege, it will be granted to them to read the secret transcript of the record taken in executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee investigation of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs expedition. That inquiry ran from April 28, 1961, to June 27, 1961. Senators may read the testimony of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lemnitzer. They may read the testimony of Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell of the CIA. They may read the testimony of the Secretary of State and of other top officials who had the responsibility at the time for American foreign policy in respect to that ill-fated operation.

I ask unanimous consent that the full list of hearings and witnesses be printed at this point.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, April 28, 1961—Senators present: Morse, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Wiley, and Carlson.

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, May 1, 1961, Dean Rusk—Senators present: Morse, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Wiley, Carlson, and Williams.

Full committee, May 2, 1961, Allen W. Dulles, Director, CIA, accompanied by Richard M. Bissell, Jr.—Senators present: Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Long, Gore, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, Carlson, and Williams.

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, May 15, 1961, Adolph A. Berle, consultant to the Secretary of State, accompanied by Robert Sayre, staff assistant, and Warren Cikins, office of congressional relations—Senators present: Morse, Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Full committee, May 17, 1961, Chester Bowles—Senators present: Fulbright, Gore, Symington, Dodd, Wiley, Aiken, and Williams.

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, May 19, 1961, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by Maj. Gen. David Gray—Senators present: Morse, Sparkman, Long, Church, Hickenlooper, Capehart, Fulbright, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Wiley, and Williams.

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, June 7, 1961, Henri Raymont, diplomatic correspondent for Latin America, UPI—Senators present: Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, and Moss.

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, June 8, 1961, Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of State accompanied by Brig. Gen. W. A. Enemark, Department of Defense—Senators present: Morse, Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Symington, Dodd, Smathers, Proxmire, Smith of Massachusetts, Stennis, and Morton.

Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs, June 22, 1961, Tad Szulc and Max Frankel, correspondents of the New York Times—Senators present: Morse, Hickenlooper, Capehart, and Carlson.

Full committee, June 27, 1961, Adlai Stevenson, accompanied by Lincoln Gordon, member of Task Force on Latin America, and

Wymerly deR. Coerr, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, after they have read the testimony, they can decide whether or not they want to make some partisan speeches involving the security of this country regarding foreign policy.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I have read the testimony the Senator refers to. It is the most inconclusive testimony I have ever had the pleasure to read. The question I raise here on the floor today is not answered in that testimony. I do not bring it up here in a partisan way; I bring it up because the Attorney General has injected this question into the minds of the American people.

Mr. MORSE. I would like to have the jury of the Senate read the testimony and decide whether or not the conclusion of the Senator from Arizona is right when he says he thinks it is inconclusive testimony. In my judgment, it is clear and unequivocal and answers the problem the Senator from Arizona is raising. We did feel that some unresolved questions needed further elaboration from the Central Intelligence Agency. So I wrote to CIA Director John McCone, outlining the matters we felt were still unclear, and asking whether he wished to add further comment or information on those points.

Mr. McCone declined to do so. I suppose it is possible that as a Republican Mr. McCone would be more responsive to a Republican inquiry, but I surely doubt that such would be the case.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Under authority of the orders of the Senate, as indicated below, the following names have been added as additional cosponsors for the following bills:

Authority of January 16, 1963:

S. 283. A bill to amend the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956: Mr. MORSE.

Authority of January 21, 1963:

S. 387. A bill to amend the Clayton Act to prohibit restraints of trade carried into effect through the use of unfair and deceptive methods of packaging or labeling certain consumer commodities distributed in commerce, and for other purposes: Mr. DOUGLAS.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. MUNDT:

Editorial entitled, "Why Not Reserve Tax Program of President," published in the Washington County (Pa.) Observer of January 18, 1963.

Founders' Day convocation address delivered by M. J. Rathbone, president of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey at Lafayette College, Easton, Pa., last October.

By Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey:

Editorial from Passaic (N.J.) Herald News of January 12, 1963; and also an article entitled "The Book Closes," written by Edward J. Mullen and published in the January 15, 1963, issue of the Trenton Herald News, being tributes to Dow Henry Drukker, late publisher and chairman of the board of the Passaic Herald News, who died in Lake Wales, Fla., a few days before his 91st birthday.

By Mr. METCALF:

Article entitled "New United Mine Workers President Reminiscent of Lewis," published in the Washington Evening Star of January 21, 1963, being a tribute to W. A. Boyle, new president of the United Mine Workers of America.

By Mr. TALMADGE:

Article entitled "John Duncan: Georgia's Big Man in Agriculture," written by Margaret Shannon and published in a recent issue of the Progressive Farmer magazine.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR AIKEN

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there is no Member of the Senate for whom the Senate has more affection, respect, and admiration than it has for the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN]. He is a good man; he is an outstanding Senator; he is a great American. He typifies Vermont and New England at their best; and his contributions to the welfare of his State, his region, and our Nation will be monuments to his patriotism and service for generations to come.

Vermont has every reason to be proud of its native son and senior Senator; and we salute him for his granite character, his understanding, his simplicity, and his tolerance.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial entitled "Tribute to Aiken," published on January 15 in the Rutland Daily Herald, of Rutland, Vt., be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

TRIBUTE TO AIKEN

When the U.S. Senate organized last week, the spotlight was on Senator KENNEDY, of Massachusetts, but a special degree of attention was paid to Vermont's Senator AIKEN, dean of Republicans in the Senate, who was nominated for President pro tempore by Senator DIRksen.

It is customary in the Senate for the two parties to nominate their senior members for the position of President pro tempore, which is largely an honorary position although it is third in the line of succession to the Presidency of the United States after the position of House Speaker. As a member of the minority, Senator AIKEN could not, of course, have been elected, but it provided the occasion for Members of the Senate to demonstrate the esteem and affection which they have for Vermont's senior Senator.

Reports from Washington indicate that the demonstration was something out of the ordinary and considerably more than routine evidence of senatorial courtesy toward a respected Member. The majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, expressed regret that he was not in a position to vote for the Vermonter.

This was not the first time that Senator AIKEN has been honored by the Senate. His high standing has been recognized before. It could also so be that Senators are well

aware of the respect with which AIKEN was treated in the last election campaign by Vermont Democrats. And that they are aware that a Democratic preselection poll disclosed that he has a greater proportion of support in Vermont than any other Senator in his home State.

ACCEPTANCE BY NEW YORK AND NEW ORLEANS STEAMSHIP ASSOCIATIONS OF STRIKE SETTLEMENT PROPOSED BY MEDIATION BOARD

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I take pleasure in announcing to the Senate, in behalf of the President's Special Mediation Board which is handling the dock strike along the east coast, in the southern ports, and along the gulf coast, that the New Orleans Steamship Association has notified the Board that it has voted to accept the proposal of the Mediation Board for settlement of the strike.

Mr. President, I submit, for printing in the Record—and ask unanimous consent for that purpose—a press release issued by me, announcing this acceptance by the New Orleans Steamship Association of the strike settlement proposed by the Mediation Board. I wish to congratulate the New Orleans Steamship Association on placing the national interest before any selfish interest.

I also submit, and request that there be printed in the Record, the full text of the telegram from Mr. R. R. Barkerding, president of the New Orleans Steamship Association, announcing its acceptance of the settlement; and I also submit for printing in the Record the Board's reply to that telegram.

I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a telegram I have received from the New York Shipping Association, announcing its acceptance, and also the reply of the Mediation Board.

There being no objection, the release and the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PRESS RELEASE FROM THE OFFICE OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, DEMOCRAT, OF OREGON

Senator WAYNE MORSE today issued the following statement:

"I am pleased to announce, in behalf of the President's Special Mediation Board handling the dock strike along the east coast and southern ports and gulf, that New Orleans Steamship Association has notified the Board that it has voted to accept the proposal of the Mediation Board for settlement of the strike. A telegram from Mr. R. R. Barkerding, president of the New Orleans Steamship Association states: 'In principle we accept the money package indicated in the memorandum of settlement proposed at New York by your Board on January 21, 1963. We also accept that the agreements previously in effect at New Orleans and which expired on September 30, 1962, shall be extended for a term of 2 years; namely, until September 30, 1964. We additionally agree to the proposed study by the Department of Labor, of manpower utilization-job security problems, as outlined, but separate and concurrent for port of New Orleans. We will make the above an official offer, including the extension of the conditions of the ex-